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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Clyde Owen Dixey appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings 
The facts and course of proceedings relating to Dixey's first post-
conviction action are as set forth by the district court in its order granting the 
state's motion for summary dismissal: 
1. In August of 2007, Dixey was tried by jury and found guilty of 
two counts of Burglary, both being felonies. Attorney Cindy 
Campbell represented Dixey at trial. 
2. Attorney Kevin Peterson substituted in as Dixey's counsel of 
record prior to sentencing. 
3. Dixey was sentenced to a fixed and determinate period of 
four (4) years, together with an indeterminate period of four (4) 
years (not less than four years nor more than eight (8) years) on 
each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. Dixey's 
sentence was suspended and Dixey was placed on probation for a 
period of five (5) years. 
4. Dixey later admitted to violating the terms of his probation 
and his probation was modified. 
5. Dixey admitted to violating the terms of his modified 
probation. His probation was revoked, his sentence was 
reimposed, and his sentence was suspended. The Court retained 
jurisdiction. Attorney Kevin Peterson continued to represent Dixey 
through the revocation of his probation. 
6. Upon receipt of the Addendum to the Presentence 
Investigation from the North Idaho Correctional Institution, the 
Court, on May 28, 2009, relinquished jurisdiction and reimposed 
Dixey's original sentence. 
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7. On October 19, 2009, attorney Kevin Peterson was allowed 
to withdraw as Dixey's counsel of record. Attorney Manuel 
Murdoch was appointed in Kevin Peterson's place. 
8. Dixey did not appeal his conviction or sentence, but he did 
file a motion for sentence reduction. Dixey's motion for sentence 
reduction was denied. Dixey did not appeal the denial of his 
sentence reduction motion. 
9. On November 18, 2008, Dixey filed his original petition for 
post-conviction relief. He amended his petition twice before it was 
adjudicated. 
10. On December 13, 2010, this Court denied all of Dixey's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims save for one: post-trial 
counsel's failure to timely appeal Dixey's conviction. 
11. Dixey's judgment of conviction for Burglary was affirmed on 
appeal. 
(R., pp.97-99 (footnotes omitted).) 
Statement of Facts and Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Dixey filed a pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief in 
December of 2011. (R., pp.4-16.) In it, Dixey raised seven separate issues of 
ineffective assistance of counsel which he asserted were not properly raised in 
his initial petition for post-conviction relief, including a claim post-conviction 
counsel had been ineffective in presenting a claim that trial counsel had failed to 
investigate alternative perpetrator evidence related to the truck used in the 
burglaries. (R., pp.5-7.) Although the district court appointed Dixey post-
conviction counsel (R., pp.61-62), there was no amended petition filed on Dixey's 
behalf. 
The state file a motion for summary disposition asserting "the claims were 
not inadequately raised" and Dixey was "simply try[ing] to reargue the claim[s]." 
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(R., p.73.) At a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal, Dixey conceded all 
but the issue relating to the ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to adequately 
present his alternate suspect evidence at trial. (R., p.96; Tr., p.12, L.7 - p.21, 
L.10.) The state argued at hearing that Dixey's claims in his successive petition 
for post-conviction relief were barred because they should have been raised in 
his initial petition. (Tr., p.22, Ls.4-7.) 
Following a hearing on the state's motion, the court issued a written 
decision granting summary disposition finding "Dixey's alibi defense was 
previously raised in his original post-conviction petition" and that "Dixey waived 
his ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claim with regard to 
ownership of the grey truck." (R., p.106.) 
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ISSUE 
Dixey states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Dixey's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief because he presented 
an issue of material fact as to whether post-conviction counseled 
[sic] was ineffective for failing to present and support his claim that 
trial counsel should have corroborated that Mr. Dixey did not own 
the pickup and that the pickup's owner fit the description of the 
perpetrator of the September 2006 incident? 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Dixey failed to establish that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Dixey Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Dixey's successive petition, finding Dixey 
failed to raise, in his original petition, the issue of whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to gather evidence regarding ownership of the vehicle used 
in the burglaries and did not show why that issue was not raised in his initial 
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.106.) The district court further found in 
dismissing Dixey's petition that he had previously raised in his original petition a 
claim counsel was ineffective in presenting an alibi defense. (Id.) The district 
court concluded Dixey failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding either 
issue and granted the state's motion to summarily dismiss Dixey's successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.) On appeal, Dixey claims "[t]he issues Mr. 
Dixey raised in the successive petition concerning the pickup's previous owner 
were not presented during Mr. Dixey's initial post-conviction action." (Appellant's 
brief, p.12.) Dixey also asserts that he did present "an issue of fact justifying an 
evidentiary hearing as to whether post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance 
present[ed] sufficient reason to permit litigation the claim in a successive petition" 
by informing "post-conviction counsel that trial counsel failed to corroborate that 
he did not own the pickup in question during September 2006 and failed to 
present evidence that the pickup's previous owner matched the description of the 
suspect." (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) Dixey's arguments are without merit. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001). On appeal from summary 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to 
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely 
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Dismissal Of Dixey's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Was 
Appropriate 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations . .kl (citing I.C. § 19-
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4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application 
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 
P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), a district court may 
dismiss a post-conviction application on the motion of any party when it appears 
that the applicant is not entitled to relief. Specifically, I.C. § 19-4906(c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and 
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Applying these principles in this case, the district court summarily 
dismissed Dixey's petition as being improperly successive. (R., pp.95-106.) 
Contrary to Dixey's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the 
applicable law supports the district court's order of summary dismissal. 
Dixey's petition was correctly dismissed on the basis that it failed to satisfy 
the criteria for a permissible successive petition under the UPCPA. Idaho Code 
§ 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and provides: 
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Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for relief 
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally 
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction 
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to 
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, 
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in 
the original, supplemental, or amended application. 
I.C. § 19-4908. In interpreting this statute, Idaho's appellate courts have held 
that "[i]neffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may provide 
sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or allegations 
inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent post-
conviction application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 
403 (Ct. App. 2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 
596, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 
P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999)). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 
however, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both that (a) his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984). 
Although Dixey argues otherwise, a review of the record shows that Dixey 
had previously raised the issue of his alibi evidence in his first petition for post-
conviction relief. Further, Dixey has failed to explain why he did not argue the 
ownership of the vehicle issue in his first petition. As such, Dixey has failed to 
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establish a "sufficient reason" to justify the filing of his successive petition in this 
case. 
Dixey raised in his original petition for post-conviction relief the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present his alibi defense. 
Subsequent to the prose filing of his original petition, counsel was appointed and 
filed additional documents, including a second amended petition for post 
conviction relief which included the claim "Petitioner does not feel like his 
attorney asked him adequate questions while he was on the stand to allow him to 
adequately present his side of the story while testifying, nor did she ask the 
questions that he wanted her to ask the witnesses." (6/19/2013 Augmentation to 
the Record, Second Amended Post Conviction Petition, p.5.) Also filed was a 
response to the state's third motion for summary disposition which included the 
following summary of Dixey's alibi: 
In paragraph 9 of Respondent's motion, Respondent states 
that "Petitioner claims that his counsel did not ask him enough 
questions at trial." This is an inaccurate statement of Petitioner's 
allegation. In paragraph 9 of Petitioner's Second Amended 
Petition, Petitioner states that he "does not feel like his attorney 
asked him adequate questions while he was on the stand to allow 
him to adequately present his side of the story while testifying ... ". 
Petitioner alleges the following facts to show that there is a material 
question of fact to be resolved by the court at an evidentiary 
hearing. Petitioner responds that Cindy Campbell cut him off 
during his testimony and instructed him to only answer the 
questions asked. This prevented him from explaining to the jury 
that he wasn't in Blackfoot during the incident of September 29, 
2006. He wanted to explain to the jury that he had just been placed 
on misdemeanor probation and was starting school at I.S.U.; that 
between his court dates, looking for a place to live and looking for a 
vehicle, he didn't have time to run around Blackfoot to be accused 
of stealing. 
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(6/19/2013 Augmentation to the Record, Petitioner's Response to Respondent's 
Third Motion for Summary Disposition, p.4.) Dixey raised the issue that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an alibi defense in his second 
amended petition for post-conviction relief and specifically addressed the claim in 
his response to the state's motion for summary disposition through his assertion 
that counsel failed to allow him to explain to the jury he could not have been 
present at the location of the first burglary offense because he was busy 
elsewhere. As such, this claim was raised in Dixey's amended petition for post-
conviction relief and cannot now be asserted in a successive petition for post-
conviction relief. Even if trial counsel had elicited the testimony detailed above 
by Dixey, such evidence does not establish an alibi for the September burglary. 
(See R., p.104.) 
Dixey further asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate and present evidence at trial that he did not own the vehicle in 
question at the time the first burglary was committed and that the person who did 
bore a resemblance to himself. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-17.) Dixey does not, 
however, provide a reason for his failure to include this claim in his initial petition 
for post-conviction relief. The information of ownership of the grey truck in 
question and the physical attributes of the person from whom he obtained the 
vehicle was known to Dixey at the time of the filing of the original petition for 
post-conviction relief. Dixey provides no reason for his failure to raise this issue 
in his first petition. In granting the state's motion for summary disposition, the 
district court found: 
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Dixey argues that he did not purchase or drive the vehicle, 
identified at the crime scene, until late October of 2006 and that he 
gave this information to his trial attorney. Nowhere in Dixey's 
original petition, the two amendments thereto, or his affidavit in 
response to the State's motion for summary disposition did Dixie 
[sic] ever mention trial counsel's alleged failure to raise this issue at 
trial. 
Dixie [sic] knew this information by the conclusion of his 
August 23, 2007 jury trial. Furthermore, a transcript of the jury trial 
was filed in his original post-conviction case on October 6, 2009. 
Thus, prior to Dixey's amended petition and affidavit, his second 
amended petition and affidavit, and his affidavit in response to the 
State's motion for summary disposition, Dixey had a full transcript 
of what happened at his jury trial. The transcript provided concrete 
proof of the evidence trial counsel did, or did not, elicit. 
Dixey gives no reason for his failure to raise the issue in his 
first post-conviction petition. He does, however, attach the affidavit 
of Yank Hensley, wherein Mr. Hensley attests that Michael 
Crumbley used the 1977 grey primer Chevy short box pickup truck 
on a regular basis in September of 2006. In a separate affidavit, 
Mr. Hensley testifies that he informed Dixey in mid-October 2006 
that the Crumbleys wished to sell their grey Chevy truck. He then 
testifies that he observed Dixey with the truck on October 26, 2006. 
Dixey offers no explanation why this information was not 
available to him in November of 2008, when he filed his original, 
prose post-conviction petition; in November of 2009 when, together 
with his appointed attorney, he file his amended petition and an 
affidavit; in May of 2010 when he and his attorney filed his 
seconded [sic] amended petition and affidavit; or in October of 2010 
when he and his attorney responded to the State's motion for 
summary disposition and filed an affidavit. 
(R., pp.104-105 (footnotes omitted).) 
The district court correctly dismissed Dixey's petition on the ground that it 
did not meet the statutory requirements for a permissible successive petition 
under I.C. § 19-4908 as the record supports the district court's finding that Dixey 
raised the alibi issue in his first post-conviction relief action, and he failed to 
establish a sufficient reason why the issue of ownership of the vehicle used in the 
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commission of the first burglary was not raised in Dixey's original post-conviction 
relief action, thus failing to make a substantial factual showing as to the 
ineffectiveness of his post-conviction counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Dixey's successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 201-3_. _ 
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